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Abstract
The paper is a discussion of whether Berry’s Paradox presupposes
the Principle of Excluded Middle, with particular reference to the
work of Ross Brady.
1 Introduction
On and off over the years, Ross Brady and I have engaged in a dialogue on the
question of Berry’s Paradox and the Principle of Excluded Middle (PEM).1
What is at issue is whether the paradox can be avoided if one gives up the
PEM . I say that it can not; he says that it can.2 This is important for
the following reason. I endorse a solution to the paradoxes of self-reference
rejecting Explosion. He endorses a solution rejecting the PEM . If I am right,
then his solution cannot handle Berry’s paradox, whilst mine can. Brady’s
most recent contribution to the debate is his (2017). This paper is mine.3
2 Berry’s Paradox
Berry’s Paradox is familiar enough to need little introduction. English, with
its current vocabulary, has an infinite number of (non-indexical) referential
1E.g., Priest (1983), Brady (1984), Priest (1987), ch. 1.
2See Brady (2017), §7.
3The considerations in what follows generally extend to Ko¨nig’s paradox. However, I
will not go into these matters here,
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singular terms (names or descriptions). However, the vocabulary is finite,
so the number of terms with less than, say 1,000 words is finite. Since the
number of natural numbers is infinite there must be numbers that are not
referred to by any of these, and so a least. By definition, this cannot be
referred to by a term with less than 1,000 words. But ‘the least natural
number not referred to by a term with less that 1,000 words’ has less than
1,000 words, and this refers to it.
A formal reconstruction of the argument can be carried out in first-order
arithmetic (with a finite number of variables, to ensure that the number
of terms of any finite length is finite), augmented by a binary denotation
predicate, D, and a description operator, µ. One may think of the operator
as either an indefinite description operator (an x such that), or a least number
operator (the least x such that); it makes not difference. D and µ satisfy the
following conditions:
• [D Schema] D 〈t〉x↔ x = t
• [Description Schema] ∃xA(x)→ A(µxA)
In the first of these, t is any (closed) term, and 〈t〉 is the numeral of its go¨del
code, which functions as the name of t. In the second, bound variables in A
are are relabelled to avoid any clash when µxA is substituted for x. We do
not assume that a µ-term denotes. How it behaves when no x satisfies A(x)
is of no importance to the argument
The paradox argument now proceeds in two stages. The first applies the
following principle of inference (where I is some finite set):
A(x)↔ ∨
i∈I
x = ni
(A(x) ∧B(x, y) ∧B(x, z))→ y = z
∃y¬∃x(A(x) ∧B(x, y))
The first premise says that the extension of A(x) comprises the nis, and so
is finite. The second says that for any x satisfying A(x) there is at most one
y such that B(x, y). The conclusion says that there is some y which is not
related by B(x, y) to any x satisfying A(x).
This inference records a purely combinatorial fact about numbers. That
is, if X is a finite subset of the natural numbers, and f is a partial function
with domain X, then the range of f cannot contain all numbers. Its validity
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has nothing to do with any particular X and f . The correctness of such
purely arithmetic reasoning is not a contested matter in this debate.
Now, take for A(x) the formula M(x) which says that x is a term of the
language with at most 1,000 symbols. This is a purely arithmetic predicate,
and the number of things which satisfy it is finite, say n1, ..., nk. Hence, the
first premise is true. For B(x, y) take Dxy. If M(x) then x is some term, t.
That is, M(〈t〉). And the D Schema tells us that if D 〈t〉 y and D 〈t〉 z then
y = t = z. Hence we have the second premise.
Given the inference, we have the conclusion:
• ∃y¬∃x(M(x) ∧Dxy)
That is, something is not denoted by any x satisfying M(x). This is the end
of the first stage of the argument.
For the second stage, let τ be µy¬∃x(M(x) ∧Dxy). Then by the result
of the first stage, and the Description Schema:
• ¬∃x(M(x) ∧Dxτ)
However, provided that M(x) is expressed in a suitably succinct way, M(〈τ〉)
is a simple arithmetic truth. Moreover, τ = τ , so by the D Schema, D 〈τ〉 τ .
(No problems are posed by the possibility that ‘τ ’ may not have a denotation,
since the result of the first stage of the argument guarantees that it has one.).
Hence, M(〈τ〉) ∧ D 〈τ〉 τ , and so ∃x(M(x) ∧ Dxτ), contradicting what was
established in the first stage.
There is no evident appeal to the PEM in all this.
3 Identity
One might suspect that the PEM has been somehow smuggled in to the
above argument. To show that this is not so is precisely the point of a full
formalisation I gave. The argument is formalised in a weak relevant logic
without the PEM , say the logic B.4 I note that the formalisation is given
for M(x) and Dxy, but can be used to establish the conclusion of the first
section of the argument of the previous section for any A(x) and B(x, y)
satisfying the premises of the general inference deployed there.
4See, e.g., Priest (2008), §§10.1-10.3.
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This argument by has been criticised by Brady.5 His objection is to the
identity principle employed in the proof:
• [S] (A(a) ∧ a = b)→ A(b)
Now, the rejection of this principle, which is endorsed by most logicians,
requires a good independent argument. Otherwise the rejection is ad hoc,
and no better than simply rejecting any other step in the argument.
What, then, are Brady’s reasons? He has two. The first is that [S] is
similar to the Pseudo-Modus-Ponens Principle (PMP ), (A∧(A→ B))→ B,
which he and I both reject for reasons connected with Curry’s Paradox.6 This
is simply an argument of guilt by association, and carries no real weight. The
second is that to derive [S] from the substitutivity principle which Brady does
accept (namely, a = b, A(a) ` A(b)) one needs principles such as PMP , or
other principles which both he and I reject. Again, the fact that there are
unacceptable proofs of something does not show that it is not true.
If one assumes that relevance is a virtue in a logic—or at least, if one
assumes that irrelevance is a vice—then one might suggest that the addition
of [S] delivers a violation of relevance. And it is certainly true that some
identity principles can deliver such violations. Thus, consider the principle
a = b→ (A(a)→ A(b)). Choose A to be any sentence with no free variables,
and no occurrences of a or b. Then a = b → (A → A), and this certainly
seems to be a violation of relevance, since the antecedent appears to have no
bearing on the consequent. However, this is clearly not the case with [S]:
(A ∧ a = b)→ A is not an intuitive violation of relevance.
Moreover, it can be shown that first-order constant-domain B, with iden-
tity governed by [S] is relevant, in the sense that if A→ B is a logical truth,
A and B must have some predicate in common.7
In any case, one does not need the full strength of [S] to carry out the
5Brady (2017), §7.
6See Priest (1987), ch. 6.
7The proof extends that given for propositions logic in Priest (2008), p. 220, ex. 11.
For part (a), we simply take the extension of every n-place predicate at ⊥ to be the set of
all n-tuples from the domain, and the anti-extension of every n-place predicate at ⊥∗ to
be the empty set. This can be achieved for = by taking the domain to be {a}, for some a.
This also satisfies the constraint required for [S]. The rest of the proof is straightforward.
I presume that the proof can be extended to stronger relevant logics by ensuring that the
ternary R satisfies the appropriate constraints.
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proof.8 As an inspection of the proof shows, however, only one application
of [S] is made. This is of the form:
• (y = 〈t〉 ∧Dyx)→ D 〈t〉x
This follows from:
• (y = z ∧ z = x)→ y = z
by the D Schema and the Substitutivity of Equivalents, which is valid in
the logic B. And Brady himself endorses this version of the transitivity of
identity for numbers!9
Finally, let us note the following. None of this has anything to do with the
PEM ! Brady’s reason for the Berry Paradox failing is that [S] fails; and [S]
is a quite different principle.10 Since Berry’s paradox is fairly uncontentiously
classified as in the same family as paradoxes such as the Liar, Brady’s solution
fails because of the Principle of Uniform Solution: Same kind of paradox,
same kind of solution.11
4 The Description Schema
An objection to the formalisation of Berry’s paradox, on quite different
grounds, has been given by Hartry Field, who also espouses a solution to
the paradoxes of self-reference rejecting the PEM . Field targets the De-
8And indeed, one might well have reservations about any version of substitutivity within
the scope of a conditional. See, for example, Priest (2008), §19.5.4-19.5.7.
9See Brady (2006), p. 314, and (2012), p. 361. I note that, oddly, nothing much is
said about identity in general in Brady’s (2006), though (y = z ∧ z = x) → y = z is a
homomorph of ((A→ B)∧ (B → C))→ (A→ C), which is an axiom of Brady’s preferred
logic (p. 6). The identity principle also holds for sets, given this propositional principle
and the definition of identity (p. 174).
10The situation seems to have arisen for the following reason. In Priest (1983) I gave
a formalisation of Berry’s Paradox which assumed that every descriptive term denotes.
Brady (1984) argued, plausibly, that this presupposes the PEM . The formalisation in
Priest (1987) does not make this assumption. Hence, Brady’s critique had to change tack.
11See Priest (1995), §11.5. The matter is different from that concerning Curry’s Paradox,
which both Brady and I wish to solve by rejecting PMP and its like. Whether Curry’s
Paradox is in the same family as paradoxes such as the Liar is a contentious matter. See
Priest (2017), §15.
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scription Schema, where µ is the least number operator, on the ground that
this implies the PEM , and so should be rejected if one rejects the PEM .12
Field’s argument goes as follows. Let B be an arbitrary sentence, and let
A(x) be x = 1 ∨ (x = 0 ∧ B). Now clearly, A(1), and so ∃xA(x). Let τ be
µxA(x). The the Description Schema gives A(τ); that is, τ = 1∨(τ = 0∧B).
This entails that τ = 1∨τ = 0. If τ = 0 then we can rule out the first disjunct,
and so B follows. If τ = 1, then ¬A(0), since this is the least n such that
A(n). That is, ¬(0 = 1 ∨ (0 = 0 ∧B)), which, given that 0 = 0, entails ¬B.
Now, if there are truth-value gaps, this argument fails. For that 1 is
the least n such that A(n) does not imply ¬A(0), since A(0) may simply
be neither true nor false. Indeed, assuming that the extensional connectives
work in the standard way (say of K3), if B is neither true nor false, so is
A(0). Hence, the argument presupposes that B ∨ ¬B; so Field’s argument
begs the question. For good measure, as already noted, the formalistion of
Berry’s paradox can be run where the description operator is an indefinite
description operator, ε. Then the fact that τ = 1 has no implications for
A(0) at all.
Indeed, given an interpretation of the language of arithmetic which allows
for the possibility that some sentences are neither truth nor false, this can
be extended to an interpretation for the least number operator. µxA(x)
denotes the least number, n, such that A(n), if there is such; and otherwise
either denotes 0 or is undefined (depending on how one wants to treat the
other case). This verifies the Description Schema, and is a conservative
extension, which does not, therefore, deliver the PEM . Similarly, for nearly
all standard logics (including B), given an interpretation of the language, this
can be extended to an interpretation for an indefinite description operator.
εxA(x) denotes an object in the domain, n, picked out by a choice function,
such that A(n), if there is such; and otherwise either denotes some fixed
but arbitrary object or is undefined (depending on how one wants to treat
the other case). This verifies the Description Schema, and is a conservative
extension. So if the PEM is not valid in the original interpretation, the
Description Schema does not deliver it.13
In his (2008), Field also argues against the Description Schema for a least-
number operator, on the ground that it would imply the existence of a cut-off
12See Field (2005), esp. fn 14, and (2008). The points below come from Priest (2005)
and (2010).
13That the Description Schema for indefinite descriptions does not imply PEM in the
context of intutitionist logic is shown in Bell (1993).
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point in sorites sequences, which is counter-intuitive. This is not relevant to
the present case, since the counter-example concerns vague predicates, and
numerical predicates are not vague. And in any case, the point does not
apply to an indefinite description operator.
5 Conclusion
We have now looked at a number of arguments as to why Berry’s paradox
presupposes the PEM . I have argued that these do not succeed. Berry’s
paradox, then, still shows that the paradoxes of self-reference cannot be
avoided by giving this up.14
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